Ethics, Justice and the Sale of Kidneys for Transplantation Purposes by Slabbert, Magda
 ISSN 1727-3781 
 
 
 
 
ETHICS, JUSTICE AND THE SALE OF KIDNEYS FOR TRANSPLANTATION 
PURPOSES 
 
 
2010 VOLUME 13 No 2 
M SLABBERT                     PER/PELJ 2010 (13)2 
 77 
ETHICS, JUSTICE AND THE SALE OF KIDNEYS FOR TRANSPLANTATION 
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M Slabbert 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Transplanting a kidney from a living,2 unrelated3 donor into another and both 
surviving afterwards has the capacity to fulfil all the central goals envisaged for the 
practice of medicine.  Such transplantations can preserve life, alleviate suffering, 
cure diseases and restore function.  However, the moral concerns raised by living 
kidney donor transplantations are complex,4 because a healthy person is subjected 
to a surgical procedure by the transplant team with no medical benefit to him,5 add to 
that financial compensation to the donor and one enters an ethical maze.  In the last 
three decades, medical ethics came under the spotlight specifically because of the 
developments in medical technology and the growing acceptance of human rights 
with the emphasis on the autonomy of persons.  These issues opened up debates 
concerning the ethical acceptability of unrelated, living kidney donors, as well as the 
possible compensation of donors – the donor being the only party to the transplant 
process who not only gains nothing,6 but also stands a chance of eventually facing a 
health risk. 
                                                 
  Magda Slabbert.  BA (Hons) HED BProc LLB LLD (UFS).  Associate Professor, Department of 
Jurisprudence, University of South Africa.  I am greatly indebted to emeritus Prof APJ Roux 
(Philosophy) for his valuable inputs and patience with this article. 
2  See Garwood-Gowers Living Donor 37; Munson "Organ Transplantation" 214: "Easing the organ 
shortage is not the only reason for valuing living donors.  Transplant surgery can be planned;  
organs are disconnected from their blood supply for a shorter time and thus remain in good 
condition;  recipients may spend little or no time on the waiting list or undergoing dialysis, so their 
health does not deteriorate;  organs from a living donor will be healthy and undamaged;  and 
good immunological compatibility between donor and recipient can often be arranged." "Kidney 
recipients benefit significantly from a living donor.  The one-year survival with a deceased-donor 
kidney is 94 per cent, but with a living-donor kidney, survival rises to 98 per cent.  Five-year 
survival increases from 80 to 90 per cent." 
3  It is with the discovery of effective immunosuppressive drugs that using kidneys from unrelated 
living donors became feasible, see Munson (n 2) 213. 
4  Rhodes "Organ Transplantation" 329.  For legislation concerning living transplantations, see 
Slabbert and Oosthuizen Obiter b 307–311. 
5  Beauchamp and Childress Principles 50. 
6  "That hospitals, surgeons, coordinators, laboratories, transport services, and organ procurement 
organisations make money from transplants is not a shameful truth, yet it is rarely mentioned in 
public. Inspiring stories of transplant miracles are the preferred sort of publicity" (Munson (n 2) 
227). 
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Medical advances have resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of organ 
transplantations each year, but there is a limited supply of organs and the demand 
for kidneys in particular, far outnumbers the supply.7 This shortage of transplantable 
kidneys prevents many critically ill patients from receiving kidney replacements that 
could either save their lives or improve the quality thereof, freeing them from dialysis 
machines.   
 
Whether donors may be compensated or whether the sale of kidneys should be 
permitted8 is influenced by ethical debates mainly amongst consequentialists, 
deontologists and virtue ethicists because most legal transplants take place in the 
Western world.  This article explores these ethical approaches and indicates some 
shortcomings, as well as their relevance in today's world.  The foundation for all 
bioethical judgments, beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and justice are also 
considered. 
 
2 Ethics 
 
Ethical issues in medicine are as old as medicine itself, for once one asked, 
'what is wrong?' and, 'what can be done?' one had also to ask, 'what should 
be done?'9 
 
Before the ethical theories can be analysed, it is necessary to explain the term 
"ethics" and consider the origins of moral thinking.  Although the philosophers of the 
                                                 
7  For statistics on organ shortages, see Cherry Kidney xi; Garwood-Gowers (n 2) 20–22, Munson 
(n 2) 212 "Every year nearly 10 000 people on the United State's Network for Organ Sharing 
(UNOS) national waiting list die without getting the organ they need to survive. They depart 
quietly, with little public notice. Yet the total of their deaths is roughly equivalent to three times 
the number of people who died in the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade 
Center."  
8  The sale of human organs is forbidden in most countries. The National Organ Transplant Act of 
1984 of the United States states:   
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive or otherwise transfer any 
human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer 
affects interstate commerce. 
Punishment includes fines up to $50 000 and/or five years in prison.  The Ethics Committee of 
the Transplantation Society issued a supporting Policy Statement stating "no transplant 
surgeon/team shall be involved directly or indirectly in the buying or selling of organs/tissues or in 
any transplant activity aimed at commercial gain" (Friedman and Friedman 'Kidney International 
960). 
9  Levinsky Ethics 24. 
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past could not foresee the developments in medical technology and the problems 
related thereto, it is worthwhile considering their way of finding an answer for an 
ethical question to serve as guidance for our ethical problems today.  Socrates, Plato 
and Aristotle emphasised reason and rationality as the basis for human well-being 
and ethical decision-making.  Aquinas added that one should have the freedom to 
choose.  More often than not, people who oppose the sale of human organs base 
their arguments on emotional outcries of human dignity or religious grounds.  Yet, if 
they were to consider arguments rationally, as the philosophers did, and reason 
about the pros and cons of the selling of human organs they might come to a 
different conclusion. 
 
2.1 What is ethics? 
 
Ethics can be characterised as the systematic inquiry into human conduct with the 
purpose of discovering both the rules that govern or ought to govern human action, 
as well as the good that is worth seeking in human life.10  Ethicists attempt to answer 
the question:  "What is right (or wrong), good (or bad)?"11 This view is as indicated 
later, not as straightforward as it may appear.  Truth-telling always appears to be 
right and actually basic to morality.  Sometimes, however, truth-telling becomes 
difficult, say for instance you were a German in the Second World War and a Jewish 
family was hiding in your cellar.  If the Gestapo knocked on your door, asking if there 
were any Jews on the premises, you would most certainly tell a lie because in the 
specific circumstances it would be better to lie than to send a whole family to the gas 
chambers.12  Ethics is thus not always about what is absolutely right or wrong, 
acceptable or unacceptable, ideal or less than ideal.  It is more about what is the 
right decision (morally speaking), in particular circumstances, what is the lesser of 
two evils, what is the balance between doing good and causing harm.13  
 
                                                 
10  Strauss S Afr J Cont Med Educ 26. To give a fuller perspective, the following remark by Abelson 
and Nielsen "History of Ethics" 81 may be of value:  "The term 'ethics' is used in three different 
but related ways, signifying (1) a general pattern or way of life, (2) a set of rules of conduct or 
'moral code' and (3) inquiry about ways of life and rules of conduct.  As examples they refer to 
Buddhist or Christian ethics for the first, professional ethics and unethical behaviour for the 
second.  What we do here exemplifies the third". 
11  Strauss (n 10) 26.  
12  Bryant, Baggott la Velle and Searle Introduction 17. 
13  Bryant, Baggott la Velle and Searle (n 12) 18. 
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A moralist will say what he thinks is good or right according to his preferred moral 
system, while an ethicist questions the underlying principles of what is good or bad, 
right or wrong.14 Generally an action is unethical if it disregards or jeopardises the 
well-being of other people, breaks an agreement, conflicts with the moral norms of a 
person or a society, and if the action will result in harm to other persons, groups or 
the environment.  
 
2.2 The development of ethical thinking 
 
2.2.1 Greek philosophy 
 
One should remember that Classic Greek philosophy is known today mostly through 
reconstructions from others and recorded memories.  In many cases, the accounts 
consist of scattered fragments and only occasionally a complete manuscript, which 
has to be interpreted.  Despite these scanty sources, it is apparent that they had 
much to offer from where they stood at the dawn of reflection on man and the world.  
 
Socrates (470–399 BC) considered ethics in relation to personal character and 
morality in asking, "what sort of person ought one to be".15 He emphasised self-
control, which for him was the basis of real freedom.  His emphasis on reason in 
moral discourse had a significant influence on Western ethics.  For him, it was 
impossible to be good without recourse to reason, in other words providing reasons 
for the rules of conduct, instead of relying on the self-justifying claim of tradition.  
Thus, he believed in the examination of moral terms in an attempt to define them.16  
 
Plato (427–374 BC) was a 'student' of Socrates and he answered the question of 
what sort of person one should be by stating that a good person was one who, to his 
mind, attended to and was guided by the form of the good.17  "This was a divine and 
external reality only imperfectly seen in everyday human existence, but supremely 
                                                 
14  For a discussion on ethics and morality, see Beauchamp and Childress (n 5)1–23. 
15  Campbell, Gillet and Jones Medical Ethics 2. 
16  Abelson and Nielsen (n 10) 83–83. 
17  Campbell, Gillet and Jones (n 15) 3. 
M SLABBERT                     PER/PELJ 2010 (13)2 
 81 
disclosed by the calm contemplations of wise men".18  Plato's disputatious method 
could not yield an ethical system.  His ethics, because of its link with the theory of 
forms, had a metaphysical – other worldly – basis.  The form of the good is for him 
analogous to our vision of sunlit objects and of the sun itself; it illuminates all aspects 
of life.19 
 
He treats impulses and desires, pleasure and the passions with disdain; an ideal life 
would be purged from these anti-rational forces.20 Although Plato's dialogues make 
interesting and challenging ethical reading it is difficult to reconstruct a Platonic 
ethical theory.  Three threads in his work, which are important if we take the further 
development in ethical theories into consideration, are:  his extreme rationalism 
(which he adopted from Socrates) with its accompanying disregard for the body and 
the passions; the metaphysical grounding of morality (the Good), in his case, linking 
it to the theory of forms; and lastly the psychological account of morality,21 which 
became very important later on. 
 
A student of Plato, Aristotle (384–322 BC) believed in the functionality of things.  
This determines the 'Good', which for man is what he seeks by nature – "Plato was 
the fountainhead of religion and idealistic ethics, while Aristotle engendered the 
naturalistic tradition" – and this he calls eudaemonia, happiness, or more correctly 
the fulfilment of his function.22  He also relied on psychology to express his moral 
views.  For him, desires were partly rational and the rational control of desires is 
moral virtue.  Thus, the highest good can only be achieved through the exercise of 
reason.23  
 
Aristotle and the 'father of medicine', Hippocrates, shared a methodology that began 
with observations of the actual world in which they lived, rather than beginning with 
                                                 
18  Campbell, Gillet and Jones (n 15) 3.  The clearest formulation of the theory of forms is the 
discussion of the divided line, Plato Republic end of Bk 6. 
19  Abelson and Nielsen (n 10) 83–85.  Directly expressed by Plato (n 18) Bk 7 (The parable of the 
cave) Sect 3. 
20  Plato Protagoras and Plato Symposium. Abelson and Nielsen (n 10) 84 "In the Protagoras and 
Symposium, Socrates argues for rational control over the body for the sake of greater pleasure in 
the long run … The image he [Plato] draws of Socrates is of a man who eats and drinks heartily 
and enjoys himself on all levels of experience but in rationally controlled proportions."  
21 Abelson and Nielsen (n 10) 83–85. 
22  Kerferd "Aristotle" 161; see also Abelson and Nielsen (n 10) 84–85. 
23  Bryant, Baggott la Velle and Searle (n 12) 20. 
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theories about life, the universe and everything else.24  Aristotle's interest in 
empirical matters made him a keen observer and classifier and made for a realistic 
approach in many ways.  Reference is made to him again later when virtue ethics is 
discussed, from which it will be clear that in moral discourse it is important to take 
the full situation into consideration.  A key concept in his moral reasoning is 
'harmony', that is, striving to reach a balance. 
 
Hippocrates (460–370 BC) was an ancient Greek physician.25 He separated the 
discipline of medicine from religion, believing and arguing that diseases was not a 
punishment inflicted by the gods but rather the product of environmental factors, diet 
and living habits.26  He is best known for the Hippocratic Oath,27 a document on the 
ethics of medical practice.  This document is rarely used in its original form today, 
but it still serves as a foundation for medical practice and morals.28 According to the 
Hippocratic Oath, the sine qua non of ethical problems in medicine is whether the 
individual concerned has acted in accordance with adequate standards of health-
care practice and secondly whether he/she has acted in the best interest of the 
patient.29  Yet, a growing number of doctors have come to feel that the oath is 
inadequate to address issues today in a world of legalised abortions, physician-
assisted suicide and illnesses unheard of in Hippocrates' time.30 
 
2.2.2 Western Christianity 
During the reign of Emperor Constantine (306–377 AD), Christianity became the 
accepted religion of the Roman Empire.31  The Church that preached that there were 
God-given absolutes on the manner in which individuals should conduct themselves 
thus moulded ethics.32  Ethical reflection during this period thus boiled down to what 
the Scripture presented as interpreted by the Church.  Ethics became a blend of the 
pursuit for earthly well-being and the preparation of the soul for eternal salvation.  
                                                 
24  Bryant, Baggott la Velle and Searle (n 12) 3. 
25  Hippocrates is included because this article adopts a medical perspective, see Strong and Cook 
www.manipal.edu.  
26  Garrison Introduction 93–94. 
27  See the original Oath in Campbell, Gillet and Jones (n 15) 277. 
28  Jones Hippocrates 217. 
29  Campbell, Gillet and Jones (n 15) 9–10. 
30  Tyson www.pbs.org. 
31  Bryant, Baggott la Velle and Searle (n 12) 20. 
32  Bryant, Baggott la Velle and Searle (n 12) 20. 
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Many of the old Greek ethical systems and considerations disappeared during this 
time, yet Hippocratic ethics was elevated because of its similarities to Christian 
ethics.33 
 
Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274 AD) was a religious thinker who incorporated 
Aristotelian ideas into the Church.  He mixed Greek ideas with ideas from the 
Christian faith.  His tendency to seek a middle way to solve problems originated from 
Aristotle.  He, like Aristotle, believed that each body part had a specific function.  
Aristotle and Aquinas developed a totality principle that forbade the distortion of the 
physical completeness of a human being.  The removal of a healthy organ cannot, 
according to this view, be justified as every organ fulfils a natural purpose as a part 
of the body as a whole and only in this set-up can their separate and common 
functions be fulfilled.  Once removed from the organism the separate organ has no 
function; it needs to belong.34 
 
Next to the body, man has a soul – which is immaterial, understands and makes free 
decisions.35 As far as his ethical ideas are concerned, Aquinas believed rationality 
controls activities and goals, and they are judged good or bad in terms of goal 
attainment and the means by which they attain these goals.  Good and evil in human 
conduct have a function in terms of ultimate happiness.  Whenever an action 
proceeds to its end in accordance with reason and eternal law, it is right.  A person is 
thus required to govern his actions as reasonably as he can, in other words making 
him more fit for ultimate happiness, in short, his theory was a self-perfectionist moral 
theory.  Accordingly, conscience is not considered a special power or moral sense, 
but a concrete intellectual judgment whereby an individual decides that a given 
action is good or bad, right or wrong.36 Accordingly, people function best if they have 
good health and the freedom to choose – "to deny someone the freedom to choose 
is immoral".37 
 
2.2.3 Science 
                                                 
33  Veatch Medical Ethics 9. 
34  Schreiber "Legal Implications of the Principle Primum Nihil Nocere as it Applies to Live Donors" 
13. 
35  Bourke "St Thomas Aquinas" 112. 
36  Bourke (n 35) 113. 
37  Bryant, Baggott la Velle and Searle (n 12) 21–22. 
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The era of the religious thinkers was followed by an era of science during which 
metaphysical assumptions were rejected in view of scientific methods.  Amongst 
others, Copernicus (1473–1543), Galileo (1564–1642) and Newton (1642–1727) 
made the most significant contributions to science.  Before them, the universe was 
seen as described in biblical terms, the heaven above and the Earth with water 
beneath it.  The Earth was regarded as the middle of the universe.38 The scientists 
revealed that this was not the truth, that the sun is in actual fact the centre of the 
universe.  A consequence of scientific progress was that people started questioning 
what the Church taught and what the scientists proved.  The religious basis for ethics 
was also questioned.  People wanted to know whether God or human beings 
determine morality.39  
 
The scientific era with its accompanying technological progress had a marked effect 
on ethical concerns.  Not only did people realise the inability to prove an ethical 
belief in contrast to the ability to prove factual scientific claims, but they also became 
aware of differences of opinion and the importance of settling ethical disputes.  The 
ground was prepared for an attitude of individualism and independence of authority 
on the one hand and a secular and humanistic ethic on the other.40  
 
The difference between ethics and science is not that ethics has a monopoly on 
disagreement – there are plenty of disagreements, even in science; however, 
scientists agree at least in principle on what kind of evidence will settle a dispute.  
There is no such agreement in ethics.41 Moreover, disagreements may be at different 
levels, within the same framework or view of life (two Christians may differ on organ 
sales) or as a clash between views of life (a Christian and a communist may differ on 
profit).  In order to answer difficult ethical questions within the same world-views, a 
framework is needed within which an individual can reflect on the acceptability of 
actions and can evaluate moral judgments and moral character.  Such a framework 
is termed an ethical theory.42 
                                                 
38  Bryant, Baggott la Velle and Searle (n 12) 22. 
39  Bryant, Baggott la Velle and Searle (n 12) 22. 
40  Abelson and Nielsen (n 10) 90. 
41  Arras and Steinbock Ethical Issues 7. 
42  Arras and Steinbock (n 41) 9.  
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2.3 Ethical theories 
 
2.3.1 Rule-based ethics 
 
Differences between religious thinkers and scientists led Immanuel Kant (1724–
1804) to develop an ethical theory.  He emphasised the duties of rational beings – he 
moved away from tradition and authority to individual reason in the sense not of 
practical intelligence in pursuit of happiness, but as the intellectual recognition of 
abstract truths, which took the shape of an internal sense of moral obligation when 
he worked out an ethical theory.43 He taught that human beings should treat others 
never only as a means, but also as an end.44 In other words, rational persons should 
act only on universally applicable principles, for example one should help people in 
need because one has a duty to assist one’s fellow men.  This he termed the 
categorical imperative.45  
 
Kant was a deontologist46 who believed in absolute rights and wrongs that are 
determined by way of reason, for example the only rational thing to do in a situation 
in which one has a choice, is to follow the call of duty without reference to the result 
or outcome.47 The greatest weakness of Kant's theory is that rights and duties can 
conflict,48 and there is no indication of the manner in which the call of duty in 
opposite directions is to be understood. 
 
A rule that formed part of his theory concerned bodily integrity.  Applied to organ 
transplants, it becomes clear that he was against organ donation and the sale of 
human organs:  "To give away or sell a tooth so that it can be planted in the jawbone 
of another [is] partial self murder."49 He said:  
 
                                                 
43  Abelson and Nielsen (n 10) 95. 
44  Bryant, Baggott la Velle and Searle (n 12) 22.  See also Campbell, Gillet and Jones (n 15) 4–5.  
Kant (Fundamental principles 62) says, "For all rational beings come under the law that each of 
them must treat itself and all others never merely as a means, but in every case at the same time 
as ends in themselves". 
45  Bryant, Baggott la Velle and Searle (n 12) 22.  
46  "Deon" (Greek) = "duty", "logos" (Greek) = "science", thus "deontology" = "science of duty". 
47  Kant (n 44) 62. 
48  Campbell, Gillet and Jones (n 15) 5. 
49  Engelhardt Foundations 314. 
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… a human being is not entitled to sell his limbs for money, even if he were offered 
ten thousand thalers for a single finger.  If he were so entitled, he could sell all his 
limbs.  We can dispose of things that have no freedom, but not of a being which has 
a free will.  A man who sells himself makes of himself a thing and, as he has 
jettisoned his person, it is open to anyone to deal with him as he pleases.50 
  
Kant's basis for his extreme view was that a person may never be a means to an 
end.  According to him, one’s body parts define one’s freedom as a human being.  
Freedom presupposes rationality, which in turn presupposes morality.  Therefore, 
relinquishing a part of one’s body would be irrational and immoral, in other words 'to 
cease to be human' – it is partly suicide.51 This argument seems in order but what if 
one should lose a limb in an accident, would one then no longer be free?  Donating a 
kidney is a free choice and as such does not deprive one of any freedom; the same 
applies to the sale of a kidney.  In our society, monetary values are already attached 
to body parts, for example, the diva insures her voice, or the tennis player insures his 
arm, even the Road Accident Fund determines the 'value' of a limb to be paid out 
after an accident.  Does this make such people less of a person?  
 
Gill and Sade also reject Kant's claim on the ground that it is not persuasive to 
consider one's humanity as dependent on a kidney.  One's humanity should rather 
be viewed as dependent on personal autonomy.  Selling a kidney should therefore 
not have destructive effects on one's humanity; they also point out that: 
 
… even if the Kantian argument that selling one's kidney violates the categorical 
imperative, because it involves treating oneself as a means only, were correct, it 
would not follow that paying a donor should be against the law.  We do not base our 
laws on the Kantian duty to respect humanity by respecting oneself.  The laws we 
make aim, rather, at protecting the (non Kantian) autonomy of individuals.  We 
protect their freedom to make personal decisions about self-regarding acts, and, if 
the decision they make is to follow their understanding of a rational moral law 
(Kantian autonomy), they are free to do that as well.  No one need sell a kidney.52 
 
2.3.2 Utilitarianism53 
Deontological ethical theories are contrasted with teleological54 theories.  In other 
words, here the purpose or the result determines whether a decision or action is 
                                                 
50  Freeman "Taking the Body Seriously?" 13. 
51  Engelhardt (49) 313–315. See also Abelson and Nielsen (n 10) 95. 
52  Gill and Sade KIEJ 25–26. 
53  See Mill Utilitarianism 1–95. 
54  "Telos" (Greek) = "goal or purpose". 
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good and therefore right or bad and therefore wrong.  This theory is also labelled the 
consequentialist ethical theory. 
 
Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) taught that the 
rightness or wrongness of an action depended on its consequences.  Right actions 
are those that produce the greatest amount of good for the greatest number of those 
affected by its consequences.55  Utilitarians are wary of the fact that the greatest 
good may also cause pain, for example, mass vaccination against an epidemic.  Mill 
introduced the factor of the quality of a good outcome.  The good of the prevention of 
an illness is superior to that of immediate bodily pleasure of painlessness.56   
 
The utilitarian argument can be used to prove too much.  Rachels refers to the 
following:  Baby Theresa was born in Florida in 1992 without the parts of the brain 
above the cortex (anencephaly).57 Her parents knew and understood that she would 
die or not have a conscious life.  They therefore volunteered her organs for 
transplantation in order to benefit other children.  Legislation in Florida did not allow 
it.  Baby Theresa died after nine days but by then her organs had deteriorated too 
much to be transplanted.  The babies who would have received a transplant died as 
well, but no one thinks of them.58  Reaction to the above, according to the rule-based 
theory of Kant, was that it is horrifying to use people as a means to another's end or 
it is unethical to kill in order to save.59 But, according to the utilitarian theory, it should 
have been allowed, because a number of babies would have benefited.  This view 
seems simple if one argues that Baby Theresa was 'brain dead' in any event. 
 
The utilitarian answer to the above issue thus seems to be 'yes', it should have been 
done, but the 'yes' evokes many uncomfortable feelings, especially if it is considered 
from another angle, for example if any one of the 'normal' babies were to be used as 
a source of organs for the other suffering babies, the effect in utilitarian terms would 
be almost the same, but it is more difficult to view this option as right or morally 
defensible.  Put differently, utilitarians do not explain the reason that public interest 
                                                 
55  Bryant, Baggott la Velle and Searle (n 12) 23. See also Campbell, Gillet and Jones (n 15) 5–8. 
56  Abelson and Nielsen (n 10) 97. 
57  Approximately 1 000 babies are born with this disorder in the United States each year.  See 
Rachels "Ethical Theory and Bioethics" 16. See also Campbell, Gillet and Jones (n 15) 137–138. 
58  Rachels (n 57) 16. 
59  Rachels (n 57) 16. 
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should always be placed above private interest.  Apart from this being factually 
untrue, it leads to the contradiction that each of us has reason to approve of self-
sacrifice in others but not in ourselves.60  
 
Arguments concerning the sale of human organs tend to fall in this category, as 
proponents of the legalisation of commerce in kidneys argue that it will benefit all the 
relevant role-players.  The patient will receive a kidney and thus a better quality of 
life.  The seller is rewarded for giving up a healthy kidney; the hospital and 
pharmaceutical companies make a profit – thus those most involved in the 
circumstances are rewarded.61 
 
Utilitarian and Kantian theories place too much emphasis on questions regarding 
what one ought to do, instead of what sort of person one ought to be.62 Moreover, 
each highlights only one aspect of a wide spectrum of ethical decisions. 
 
2.3.3 Virtue ethics63 
 
In criticising rule- and consequence-based ethical systems, it is sometimes argued 
that moral situations and good conduct cannot be codified in rules or principles 
meant to apply to all individuals in all kinds of situations and at all times.  These rules 
and principles also cannot always provide 'correct answers' to moral questions.  In 
place of such rule-based theories, virtue ethics with its emphasis on a virtuous 
character is proposed but in full realisation of the truth, to be virtuous is to act 
virtuously. 
 
Virtue ethics originated from Aristotle64 and was revived in recent times by MacIntyre 
in his controversial book After Virtue.65 They agree that various substantive virtues 
(Aristotle also speaks of "excellences") such as benevolence, honesty, justice, truth-
telling, empathy, knowledge, health, friendship, security, beauty, and others need to 
be practised, be part of your character, if one wishes to flourish and live well.  How?  
                                                 
60  Abelson and Nielsen (n 10) 97. 
61  See also Friedlaender Lancet, in which he argues he is a utilitarian, but also a humanitarian. 
62  Oakley "A Virtue Ethics Approach" 86. 
63  Campbell, Gillet and Jones (n 15) 8–9. See also Oakley (n 62). 
64  Aristotle "The aim of human activity. The Nicomacheon Ethics" 159–173. 
65  MacIntyre After Virtue. 
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One will be able to make the appropriate moral decisions in practical situations of 
moral choices if one possesses the virtue of practical wisdom, which will guide one in 
putting the relevant virtue into practice.66 Oakley67 refers to the example of abortion, 
which, according to him, has nothing to do with the competing rights of a woman and 
a child.  The decision to have an abortion should depend solely on the character of 
the woman who has to decide on having an abortion within her particular 
circumstances. This sounds a bit naïve and a little more is needed to understand this 
approach, particularly in the context of applied ethics, in which the emphasis is on 
doing the right thing.   
 
In order to seek to understand the idea of virtue ethics, imagine a square 
representing moral decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
The overall goal is happiness or to flourish and live well – but as an objective desire, 
chosen because it is in itself desirable and choice-worthy.  The four corners are four 
sets of considerations en route to a moral choice.  
 
Human and therefore the subject's happiness can be neither egotistical nor 
paternalistic – one can only be in charge of one’s own good and can only seek to 
contribute to another's ability to flourish.  For example, with reference to the selling of 
a kidney:  Am I physically/emotionally/socially ready to give up a healthy kidney?  
Virtues such as knowledge, security and health come into play.  The choice/action 
                                                 
66  Aristotle  (n 64) 163. 
67  Oakley (n 62) 92. 
Subject Reasonableness 
Right/Wrong? 
Society Situation 
Happiness 
M SLABBERT                     PER/PELJ 2010 (13)2 
 90 
should also be reasonable, in other words properly substantiated and underpinned 
by the right motives; and should itself be reasonable and reasonably executed.  For 
example: Why sell a kidney?  Why not?  Why legally?  Why not on the black market?  
Is the procedure to remove a kidney scientific/acceptable/the best manner of doing 
so?  Virtues such as honesty, truth-telling and justice should be considered.  
 
Society is also something to reckon with – no human being exists on its own; other 
persons and their situations or requirements have to be taken into account.  As 
Aristotle realised, a person needs 'external goods' to flourish and be virtuous, but 
these other people in their turn also have the desire to flourish.  Human beings 
depend on each other to realise their goals, and they are an essential part of your 
context in making moral decisions.  For example: What are my parents'/my 
family's/my church's/my peers' views on selling a kidney?  Again, virtues such as 
honesty, benevolence, justice and friendship are important.  
 
Lastly, what are the merits of the situation at hand (right action)?  For example: Does 
the situation merit the selling of a kidney?  The virtues of justice, benevolence, 
honesty and knowledge are relevant.  Thus, "there is no single, neutral model to 
which each person's pattern of weighing of these goods and virtues must conform".68 
As indicated above, both the complete situation and the possibilities and 
weaknesses of the subject have a place in a moral decision; the focus is on 
providing situation-specific and local solutions to moral problems – this is referred to 
as the uncodifiability thesis.  "The virtue ethicist … denies that there are any absolute 
principles … to which we can appeal in cases of moral conflict.  Instead, we should 
carefully consider all morally relevant aspects of the situation and seek to balance or 
reach a compromise between various moral claims".69 
 
The discussion of virtue ethics focused on the patient or the kidney seller and not so 
much on the doctor.  The position of the doctor will be discussed in the next section.  
Here, it suffices to say that while money exchanges hands this should not influence 
the doctor, as his responsibility lies with his patient, regardless of whether that 
person received a donated kidney or bought one from a willing seller. 
                                                 
68  Van Zyl S Afr J Philos 137. 
69  Van Zyl (n 69) 138. 
M SLABBERT                     PER/PELJ 2010 (13)2 
 91 
 
Criticism against virtue ethics is that it rejects universalisation (deriving a general rule 
for future action from a particular decision), which is regarded as a necessary 
condition for an ethical decision to be rational.70  Van Zyl argues that virtue ethicists 
make use of general principles to help them decide; they are also in principle not 
opposed to attempts at deriving guidelines for future assistance from the way in 
which a particular situation was handled, should a similar situation re-occur.71  
However, "we cannot expect rules to do all the moral work for us …".  Van Zyl 
concludes, "the focus on character rather than the rules of right action is a response 
to a practical problem, which does not … require us to reject the principle of 
universalisability."72 
 
The three historical ethical theories provide only little guidance regarding the 
justification of organ sales.  According to Kant and the followers of the rule-based 
approach, organ sales should never be allowed because these affect freedom and 
thus limit humanness, but this seems unconvincing as Kant clearly also valued 
human autonomy.  The utilitarians might be able to justify commerce in kidneys 
ethically because of the greatest reward to all those involved in the transplant 
process.  This seems as a clear 'yes' in favour of organ sales, but once again it is 
unconvincing, because of the confusion between inclination and obligation, and no 
clear convincing argument for the dominance of public satisfaction over self-
satisfaction.  If virtue or character is analysed as an ethical basis for the justification 
of selling a kidney, it appears that it will depend on each individual involved – the 
doctor, the patient and the seller.  There can be no clear 'yes' or 'no' for organ sales, 
because these ethicists refrain from offering universal guidelines – each case has to 
be judged on its own.  This position resembles bioethics, which advocates that 
morality cannot be codified in rules and each situation should be approached 
differently. 
 
It appears that the old philosophers and existing ethical theories offer some 
assistance, but are not yet convincing in justifying the practice of buying and selling 
                                                 
70  Van Zyl (n 69) 136. 
71  Van Zyl (n 69) 138. 
72  Van Zyl (n 69) 139. 
M SLABBERT                     PER/PELJ 2010 (13)2 
 92 
kidneys for transplantation.  It is thus necessary to consider current debates in 
applied ethics concerning organ sales. 
  
3 Bioethics73 
 
The Twentieth Century saw a decline in Western paternalism as societies became 
more egalitarian.  Questions were asked on the manner in which religious absolutes 
could be applied to issues about which texts such as the Bible or the Koran knew 
nothing.74 It is during this time that the term "bioethics" was developed in the United 
States.  According to bioethicists, instead of relying on the old scriptures or ethical 
theories, one has to determine the appropriate use of new developments and 
technologies in medicine.75 Whereas ethics deals with general standards and 
principles of moral reasoning and is therefore a starting point, bioethics deals with 
moral issues in particular cases.  Bioethicists want to know what the best is for a 
patient, not merely what this or that theory enunciates.76  
 
Bioethicists take cognisance of medicine, law, economics and public policy,77 and 
they doubt whether there can be one satisfactory ethical theory, as they believe 
morality cannot be codified in rules.78  Medical situations differ too much; one rule 
cannot be applied to all situations.  A major impetus to the development of bioethics 
was technological developments in medical treatment, such as the respirator in 
1950, dialysis machine in 1960, the first heart transplant in 1967, followed by the 
possibility of transplanting organs from unrelated donors with the help of 
immunosuppressant medicine.79 
 
"Bioethical controversies are too complicated to be resolved by the simple 
application of a [specific] theory: Theories are general and abstract, while real life is 
messy and detailed".80 Rachels81 therefore advocates mid-level principles or 
                                                 
73  "Bio" (Greek) = "life", "bioethics" = "ethics of life". 
74  Bryant, Baggott la Velle and Searle (n 12) 24–25. 
75  Bryant, Baggott la Velle and Searle (n 12) 25. 
76  Rachels (n 57) 15. 
77  Kuhse and Singer "What is Bioethics?  A Historical Introduction" 10. 
78  Kuhse and Singer “What is bioethics? A historical  introduction” 15. 
79  Trzepacz and DiMartini Transplant Patient. 
80  Rachels (n 57) 11. 
81  Rachels (n 57) 17. 
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everyday moral rules as expressed in common sense, which is nearer to our hearts 
than general philosophical theories or higher-level principles.  According to her, 
bioethicists doubt the value of ethical theories because there are too many different 
theories that sometimes conflict with each other and these theories were developed 
in the context of a specific historical tradition that was not able to foresee the medical 
developments of today.82 
 
3.1 The four pillars of bioethics 
 
3.1.1 Beneficence 
 
The principle of beneficence means that a doctor should act in the best interest of a 
patient83 or as the Hippocratic writings determine "at least do no harm".84 By applying 
this principle, one may be confronted by the doctrine of double effect, meaning that a 
certain course of action with an overall benefit may be ethical even if it causes some 
harm.85 By transplanting a kidney into a patient, regardless of whether the kidney is 
paid for, the doctor is improving the patient's quality of life.  However, by removing a 
kidney from a healthy person's body, beneficence cannot be applied alone except for 
the double effect.  The second principle, namely non-maleficence should therefore 
be considered simultaneously as beneficence cannot directly be applied to non-
therapeutic interventions.  
 
3.1.2 Non-maleficence 
 
With regard to the living donor, non-maleficence (to do no harm) as a principle is to a 
measured extent breached since the surgery and the loss of an organ do carry some 
risks for the donor.86 A study done in the United States of America showed that the 
risks are however small, as only 0,03 per cent of kidney donors died in a four-year 
                                                 
82  Rachels (n 57) 19–20. 
83  See Garwood-Gowers (n 2) 41–46. 
84  Garwood-Gowers  2. 
85  Garwood-Gowers  2. 
86  Gutmann and Land Langenbeck’s Arch Surg. . 
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cycle after the donation and life-threatening or permanent complications occurred in 
only about a quarter of a per cent of donors.87 
 
It would be narrow-minded to focus only on the donor, as the doctor has two patients 
to consider, both the donor and the recipient.88 This is a unique problem with living 
donations:  the combination of, on the one hand, the healing of a human being and, 
on the other hand, the strain and endangering of another.89 
 
Since the donor consented90 to the donation and it is for the physical benefit of the 
recipient, the infringement of this principle to do no harm is outweighed by the 
respect for the donor's autonomy and the principle of beneficence, in other words, by 
the overall increasing of the harm-benefit relation with regard to both donor and 
recipient.  
 
Schreiber91 lists four essential preconditions for the admissibility of living donors, the 
last being questionable: 
 
 the risks to the donor must be compared with the needs of the 
recipient;  
 the donor must be extensively informed about risks and dangers before 
the operation can take place;  
 the agreement must be made willingly and with no form of pressure 
and, lastly;  
 the organ donation may not be made in connection with monetary 
reimbursement. 
 
The significance of the last precondition is not clear.  That money is exchanged does 
not influence the informed consent requirement, nor does it increase the risks to the 
donor (seller); is monetary reimbursement any more pressurising than the situation 
                                                 
87  Munson (n 2) 215. 
88  Schreiber (n 34) 14. 
89  Schreiber (n 34) 14. 
90  See S 18 of the Human Tissue Act 65 of 1983.  See also S 55 of the National Health Act 61 of 
2003.  The National Health Act with the exception of several chapters (including Chap 8 on organ 
transplants) came into effect on 2 May 2005.  S 93(1) of the Act repeals the Human Tissue Act in 
total, but this will only be effected on a date fixed by the President as publicised in the 
Government Gazette.  In the interim, the Human Tissue Act and its regulations remain in force.  
91  Schreiber (n 34) 14. 
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in which a family member feels pressurised to donate an organ if he or she is an only 
match? 
 
Schreiber goes on to say the donor must be extensively informed before consenting 
to the operation, so that the donor is not dealt with as a mere object.  Again, what 
difference will rewarding the donor make?  To argue that economic motives may 
hinder or exclude a voluntary decision does not carry weight.92 
 
3.1.3 Autonomy 
 
The word "autonomy"93 was first used in correlation with states that were self-
governed.  Philosophers adapted this term to be applicable to the rights and interests 
of individuals.  Kant taught that a person has free will and can therefore decide what 
should be done in specific circumstances, and by implication, he is also responsible 
for his own actions.  "For Kant, autonomy requires acting in accordance with one's 
true self – that is, one's rational will."94 In other words, being autonomous means 
doing as one ought to, as a rational being. 
 
In bioethics, the right to self-determination95 and the giving of informed consent96 are 
closely linked to the principle of autonomy.  In the liberal tradition of ethical thought, 
respect for a person's autonomy means respect for his/her voluntary choices and 
can be summarised as follows:  
 
I wish my life and decisions depend on myself, not on external forces of 
whatever kind.  I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's, 
acts of will.  I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by 
conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it 
were, from outside.  I wish to be somebody, not nobody: a doer – deciding, 
not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or 
                                                 
92  Schreiber (n 34) 16. 
93  "Autos" (Greek) = "self", "nomos" (Greek) = "rule". 
94  Morgan Medical Law 87–88. 
95  S 12(2) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  Section 12(2)(b) reads as follows:  
"Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right to security 
in and control over their body."  The common law also recognises the right to self-determination. 
96  Consent as ground for justification is based on the maxim volenti non fit injuria (to him who 
consents, no injury occurs).  Giving informed consent as an ethical requirement is now statutorily 
laid down in the National Health Act S 6, 7 and 8.  See also Oosthuizen and Verschoor SA Fam 
Pract. 
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by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal or a slave … I wish, above all, 
to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing 
responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references to my 
own ideas and purposes.97 
 
Should a person wish to sell his/her organs, he/she should be permitted to do so,98 
unless there is clear evidence that harm will follow.  As Radcliffe Richards99 argues, 
if the rich are free to engage in dangerous sport, or people are allowed to do 
dangerous work for high pay, it is difficult to understand the reason the person taking 
a lesser risk of kidney selling should be protected against himself.  It seems that it is 
only those who have resources and can indulge in refined moral sensibilities who 
oppose the option of selling a kidney.  These same sceptics are quite willing to let 
the poor do other life-threatening activities, such as working in coalmines or cleaning 
windows of skyscrapers.100  
 
To be autonomous means to give informed consent.  In order to give informed 
consent in a therapeutic setting, the nature of the procedure must be explained to 
the prospective patient101 (seller):  the effects of the operation and the part of the 
body affected; the duration of the operation; information regarding the anaesthetic, 
X-rays or scans; and the risks in connection with the operation, the likelihood that the 
risks will eventuate and the effect of such risks should they eventuate. 
 
Requiring informed consent102 is a way to ensure that a potential seller understands 
all the risks of a kidney being removed; this is not to protect the person from the 
consequences of his/her actions but rather to ensure that he/she knows the nature 
and result of each course of action before making a decision.103 The decision 
whether to take the risk of removing a kidney should be that of the donor or the 
seller, not the doctor.  "Those who want organs want them now because life is finite.  
The paternalistic role of doctors in which they make all the decisions for patients is 
                                                 
97  Isaiah Berlin as quoted in Young "Informed Consent and Patient Autonomy" 441. 
98  S 28 Human Tissue Act and S 60(4) National Health Act prohibit payment for human organs.  
See also n 89. 
99  Radcliffe Richards "From Him that Hath Not" 191. 
100  Trzepacz and DiMartini (n 80) 248. 
101  For the legal requirements regarding consent in a therapeutic environment, see Young (n 102) 
441–451. See also Castell v De Greef 1994 4 SA 408 (C) and Van Oosten De Jure 1995 165–
179. 
102  See S 7 National Health Act. 
103  Munson (n 2) 218. 
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long outdated.  With improved communication and access to information through the 
Internet, for example, patients are now well informed and they usually ask doctors for 
advice, not decisions."104 
 
3.1.4 Justice105 
 
Harris argues that any commercial scheme concerning human organs for 
transplantation should include safeguards against wrongful exploitation of vulnerable 
people.106  He continues by saying that considerations of justice and equity should 
be taken into account.  If all of this can be complied with, he feels strongly that the 
selling of human organs will not prima facie be unethical.  He also feels it is fair to 
protect the most vulnerable – the desperate patients – by permitting another group to 
choose the option of selling; by doing so, they do not only benefit their fellow being, 
but they also benefit themselves financially.107 
 
Section 27 of the Constitution gives everyone the right to access to health care.  In 
Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal),108 the Constitutional Court had 
to interpret the scope and content of the right to access to health care under Section 
27.  The appellant was a diabetic suffering from a heart disease, vascular disease 
and irreversible renal failure whose life could be prolonged by means of regular 
dialysis.109 He was not admitted to the dialysis programme at the Addington Hospital 
in Durban because the hospital did not have sufficient resources to provide dialysis 
to all patients suffering from renal failure.  The primary requirement of the hospital for 
admission of a patient on dialysis was his eligibility for a kidney transplant.  Because 
of his other illnesses, he was not a candidate for a transplant and therefore also not 
allowed on the dialysis programme.  He applied to the local division of the High Court 
to direct the hospital to provide him with dialysis but the application was dismissed.  
He then appealed to the Constitutional Court.110 
                                                 
104  Friedlaender (n 61) 972. 
105  For a discussion on legislation concerning organ transplants, see Slabbert Handeldryf; Slabbert 
and Oosthuizen Obiter a 44–64; Slabbert and Oosthuizen b 304–323. 
106  Harris "Clones, Genes and Immortality:  Ethics and the Genetic Revolution" 1772–1774.  
107  Harris (n 113) 1774. 
108  1997 12 BCLR 1696 (CC). 
109  Dialysis is a procedure to preserve or extend a person's life when his/her kidneys have stopped 
functioning. 
110  For a discussion of the case, see Moellendorf SAJHR 327. 
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In summary, the Court held that the obligation imposed on the State under Section 
27 was dependent upon the resources available.  Owing to budgetary constraints, 
there were not enough dialysis machines available at the hospital to treat all patients.  
Were all the people in South Africa who suffer from chronic renal failure to be 
provided with dialysis treatment, the cost of doing so would substantially affect the 
health budget allocated.111 It is thus submitted that in view of the above, the State 
should allow a patient an alternative by permitting him to buy a kidney from a living 
donor (seller) and thereby be removed from the dialysis programme and no longer 
be a financial burden to the State.112 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
Concerns about the availability of organs for transplantation should not blind one to 
the dignity and importance of each human being.  We should also allow ourselves to 
view things in a different light to the one that immediately comes to mind.113  This 
article has focused on whether there are ethical arguments that render payment to 
kidney donors inherently wrong.  My conclusion is there are no convincing 
arguments.  I agree with Munson that if the requirements of beneficence, non-
maleficence, autonomy and justice are met, donations are morally acceptable, but 
then it should also be legitimate to sell a kidney, as both acts – donating and selling 
– are the result of a decision made voluntarily.  In the case of donation, the individual 
is altruistic; in the case of selling, the individual desires to be remunerated 
financially.114 
 
Once we have agreed that autonomy is the ground for legitimising an 
individual's decision to donate a kidney we must also acknowledge it is 
legitimising his decision to sell a kidney.115 
 
                                                 
111  For criticism of this point, see Van Oosten De Jure 1999 13–14. 
112  According to the Discovery Health Medical Aid Fund, dialysis can cost up to R85,000.00 per 
annum.  It is more cost effective to transplant a kidney, as the operation is paid for once-off.  
Friedman and Friedman (n 8) argue that money saved by decreasing the number of dialysis 
patients might fund additional kidney transplants. 
113  Trzepacz and DiMartini (n 80) 253. 
114  Munson (n 2) 226. 
115  Munson (n 2) 226. 
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The boni mores of society change constantly.  Behaviour that used to be regarded 
as unacceptable a few years ago, such as performing abortions, having children 
without being married or even transplantations from dead bodies, are now regarded 
as 'normal'.  Thus, a future in which persons have the autonomy to buy and sell a 
kidney is not unimaginable.116  A legal trade can be regulated, whereas the black 
market and present practices cannot – bad legislation can kill people.117 Friedman 
and Friedman ask why it is regarded as so ethically wrong to sell a kidney.  Why is it 
worse than selling one's sperm or ova, transactions that are legal in the United 
States?  Commercialisation of sperm and ova should be morally more questionable 
than selling a kidney because those cells can create entirely new human beings.118 
 
Debates on the selling and buying of human organs have in the past focused on 
ethical discourse rather than the law and the debates were mainly against the 
commercialisation, but change is now imperative.  Ethics is not something for 
philosophers only.  The general public is more aware than ever of their rights and 
demands regarding individual autonomy; they also see ethics in a wider context.  
Should the legislator not change the law in such a way as to allow each individual 
the freedom to choose according to his/her belief and his/her rational reasoning 
whether to sell a kidney? 
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